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Abstract:  The rapid growth in China’s domestic investment in recent decades has generated a 
large appetite for global goods, especially from sub-Saharan Africa. This paper estimates the 
economic impact of changes in China’s involvement in sub-Saharan Africa’s trade and 
investment growth by using empirical evidences. China has become a major development 
partner of sub-Saharan Africa, as its trade, investment, and aid ties with the region have 
increased remarkably in recent years, but the evidences provided by different sources differ 
leading to myths regarding China’s involvement in Africa. Although rising trade with China has 
allowed African countries to diversify their export base across countries, away from advanced 
economies. Further, the domestic producers in Africa face stiff competition from the cheap 
Chinese products including labor disputes as well. Finally, China’s involvement in Africa brings 
about positive economic impact and international exposure even out of financial crises. 
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1. Introduction 
 
    China has emerged as Africa’s largest trading partner, providing demand for the continent’s 
energy and minerals. At the same time, there is a growing volume of Chinese direct investment 
in Africa. Some of it has taken the form of high-profile natural resource deals in countries with 
poor track records of governance (e.g., Angola and Sudan). These developments have given rise 
to a number of ideas about Chinese investment in Africa. That it is on the same enormous scale 
as China’s trade; that it is aimed primarily at natural resources; and that it is concentrated in 
countries with poor governance. Western critics expressed their views in different ways such 
as China is attempting wild rush into Africa or China’s investment into Africa maybe regarded as 
exploitation. Some research papers expressed doubt that why is China investing in Africa and the 
evidences are collected from the firm level, and finally it shows that each of these ideas is, to a 
large extent, a myth not backed up by data. 
    By the end of 2009, 45.7 percent of China's cumulative foreign aid of Yuan 256.29 billion had 
been given to countries in Africa. Further, China became Africa's largest trading partner, 
surpassing the United States in 2009. In 2012, China's trade with Africa reached USD 198.5 
billion, while U.S.-African trade was USD 99.8 billion in the same year. China's trade with 
Africa is only 5 percent of its global trade total. More than 80 percent of China's USD 93.2 
billion in imports from Africa in 2011 was crude oil, raw materials and resources. In 2011, 
China's investment in Africa was 4.3 percent of its global total (Asia represented 60.9 percent, 
Latin America 16 percent, and Europe 11.1 percent).In 2012, the China Development Bank 
agreed to provide USD 3 billion as loans to Ghana, which was almost 10 percent of Ghana's 
GDP. South Africa is China's largest trading partner in Africa, at a volume of USD 20.2 billion. 
Yet this is 4 percent of China's trade with the European Union. 
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   In particular, China has become a major development partner of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as 
its trade, investment, and aid ties with the region have increased remarkably in recent years. 
China’s real GDP has grown by an average of 10 percent a year in the past decade, and so has its 
need to import an entire range of products e.g. minerals, farm products, timber, and oil etc. to 
satisfy the fast pace of domestic investment, which increased fivefold in the same period. Its 
investment as a share of GDP increased from 34 percent in 2000 to 46 percent in 2012. Its stock 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) reached about USD16 billion in 2011 and China has stepped 
up its financial assistance to the region, including a credit of USD 20 billion to Africa in the 
conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2012. The increasing role of 
China in SSA reflects China’s increasing share as a major player in world trade and its historic 
reorientation toward new markets that started in the last decade, including toward SSA countries 
(IMF, 2011). 
2. China’s Interest in Africa: Some Controversial Evidences 
   While there is huge debate over China’s presence in Africa as it is one player, albeit a large 
player among many as shown by the Economist (Figure 2.1). China’s trade with Africa is the 
largest in the world but this year India’s trade with Africa will rise to almost USD 100 billion 
and is increasing faster than China’s. In FDI western nations have far larger amounts invested in 
Africa compared to China. 






   China has increasingly become conscious of its image in Africa and concerns that have been 
raised over environmental and social safeguards as well as labor issues. Cases of human rights 
abuses have arisen from Chinese-African co-operation. African workers have protested against 
ill treatment and poor pay by Chinese companies, as well as the influx of Chinese workers who 
took away local jobs. In July 2010, hundreds of African workers at a Chinese-owned Zambian 
mine rioted over low wages. 
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     In the IMF working paper Drummond and Liu (2013) examine some of the costs and benefits 
of China’s engagement with Sub Saharan Africa. Many existing studies focus on whether 
China’s larger involvement in Africa benefits or hurts the region overall. While some scholars 
and African policymakers have claimed that more trade between China and SSA has benefited 
the region (Ajakaiye and others, 2009; Renard, 2011), others have warned about losses owing to 
greater exposure to commodity price fluctuations and reduced demand for African production 
because of competition from China (Ademola, Bankole, and Adewuyi, 2009). 
 
   Among the studies that attempt to quantify China’s impact on the global economy, Ahuja and 
Nabar (2012) argue that a 1 percentage point slowdown in investment in China is associated with 
a reduction of global growth of just under 0.1 of a percentage point. Arora and Vamvakidis 
(2010) find positive spillover impact of China’s growth on the world and this impact has 
increased in the recent decades, a 1 percentage point increase in China’s growth is associated 
with an average 0.5 percentage point increase in the growth of other countries. In Africa, 
Ademola, Bankole, and Adewuyi (2009) analyzed trade patterns between China and Africa both 
at the aggregate Africa and at the national level. They conclude that African countries that gain 
from trade with China are oil exporters; ore and metal exporters; cotton exporters; and log timber 
exporters. 
 
    Although the total trade volume between China and Africa has grown rapidly, the speed of 
such growth has slowed down from 19.3 percent in 2012 to 5.9 percent in 2013. Such a rate is 
also lower than the growth of China's overall foreign trade i.e. 7.6 percent in the same year. 
While the broad context is the slowdown of China's economic growth and of its foreign trade, 
exports by Africa suffer in particular because China's demand for raw materials has declined. 
China ran a small deficit in its trade with Africa, while its exports are still largely dominated by 
finished products including machineries, electronics, automobiles, textiles, etc. Meanwhile, 
despite the reiterated efforts that China would reduce the percentage of natural resources imports 
in Sino-African trade, natural resources remain dominant. In total, China's crude oil imports from 
Africa made up 23 percent of China's global imports in 2013, making Africa the largest exporter 
of crude oil for China. 
 
3. Chinese FDI Flows to Sub Saharan Africa 
 
   China is the largest developing country foreign investor in Africa (UNCTAD 2013). The 
relationship started in the early 1980s, as part of concerted diplomatic efforts promoting Chinese 
economic cooperation with Africa. Initial investments were small, amounting to USD 51.9 
million for 102 projects (about USD 500,000 per project) between 1979 and 1990, with Chinese 
businesses relying heavily on government-sponsored assistance projects to gain a foothold in 
local African markets (Government of China 2013). The distinction between foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and official assistance may at times be ambiguous. For example, in 
investments by Chinese state-owned enterprises can be included in definitions of official flows 
of development assistance, if they receive subsidized state financing such as export credits. 
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    Chinese FDI in Africa surged during and in the wake of the global financial crisis and 
continues to diversify. FDI flows from China to SSA rose from next to nothing a decade ago to 
USD 3.1 billion in 2013, representing 7 percent of global FDI flows to SSA. China has 
established itself as a major investor in Africa, a dynamic that runs parallel to China’s growing 
trade involvement. China’s FDI stock in SSA reached nearly USD 24 billion in 2013, reflecting 
an annual growth rate of 50 percent between 2004 and 2013 (MOFCOM 2003-2014; Copley, 
Maret-Rakotondrazaka, and Sy 2014). The global economic crisis of 2008–09 marked the 
beginning of a major expansion in China’s engagement with SSA, in scope and in scale. While 
some foreign investors moved out of Africa, Chinese firms, already well leveraged at home and 
encouraged by the Chinese government, expanded their overseas operations. Mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) surged and commercial lending and other financing arrangements set new 
records. Oil and other extractive industries remain the sectors of greatest interest to Chinese 
investors (at 30 percent of total investment), but Chinese FDI has recently undergone a marked 
diversification into financial services, construction, and manufacturing. Geographically, Chinese 
FDI continues to be concentrated in Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, and Zambia, but it now 
extends across the continent. Chinese manufacturing firms have invested in countries as diverse 
as Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Tanzania. A review of a sample of Chinese Greenfield investments in 
SSA during the past decade reveals the rising importance of the manufacturing sector and the 
increasingly significant contribution of Chinese FDI to job creation in countries across the 
continent. 
 




Source: UNCTAD 2014; MOFCOM 2014 
 
   In any event, private investment flow is rising fast (Gu 2009) and, to the extent they are 
channeled via tax shelters, are likely to be underreported (Sun 2013). The officially reported 
stock of Chinese FDI in Africa was estimated at USD 21 billion in 2012, a doubling since 2009 
(Figure 3.1). Reported flows are similar in magnitude to flows from the United States, with the 
largest share directed toward the resource sector, notably in Angola, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, 
Sudan, and Zambia. Chinese investment in other sectors is substantial, especially in 
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manufacturing (Figure 3.2). This is seen in the gradual development of manufacturing clusters in 
Ethiopia (glass, fur, footwear, and automobiles), Mali (sugar refineries), and Uganda (textiles 
and steel pipe manufacturing).  
 
Figure: 3.2 Chinese foreign direct investments in Africa, by sector, 2012 
                              
 
Source: Government of China 2013. 
Although partly driven by growing business opportunities in Africa, the shift toward 
manufacturing is also indicative of Chinese firms’ efforts to develop global value chains as 
domestic labor costs increase relative to lower-cost Africa.  African firms in turn have gained 
growing access to Chinese markets; since 2012, China has given some 30 countries in SSA zero-
tariff treatment (covering about 60 percent of their exports) and is importing a growing share of 
manufactures from the region (Figure 3.2). 
 
   The relationship is a complex one, involving multiple and diverse state actors in China, often 
(but not always) coordinating with state-owned and private corporations in a range of sectors 
across countries in SSA (Bräutigam 2009). Although commodities and associated infrastructure 
projects have tended to dominate the relationship, Chinese investment in other sectors is also 
increasing, notably in manufacturing. In recent years, the Chinese government has increasingly 
provided assistance for social development projects, and has engaged in peacekeeping and 
security operations. 
 
3.3 Development Finance 
 
   Africa is the largest recipient of Chinese development financing and its share is increasing. 
Africa received nearly half of the cumulative USD 54 billion provided by China in global foreign 
aid through 2012 (Figure 3.4), significantly more than any other region (Government of China 
2011, 2014). Chinese official development assistance has been, by and large, complementary to 
aid from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Chinese 
and OECD official development assistance differ substantially in scale, nature, and degree of 
 
Figure: 3.4 Distribution of aid and development financing flows from China 
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      Source: Government of China 2011, 2014. 
 
concessionality (Bräutigam 2011). Although Chinese assistance increased rapidly as OECD 
disbursements declined (Figure 3.4), Chinese aid remains well below the OECD’s, amounting to 
USD 3.2 billion in 2013 compared with the USD 26 billion disbursed by OECD countries in the 
same year (Figure 3.4). Chinese development assistance is frequently packaged into agreements 
that mix grants and investment, and concessional and non concessional loans (Bräutigam, 2011). 
 
   China is also increasingly channeling development assistance through multilateral institutions, 
including a USD 2 billion co-financing fund between the People’s Bank of China and the 
African Development Bank in 2014. Finally, OECD country development assistance is typically 
accompanied by greater conditionality on social development projects and policy reforms. As a 
result, almost two-thirds of OECD assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa flows to the social 
infrastructure in health, education, water, and sanitation, or toward emergency relief and food 
aid. In contrast, half of Chinese assistance is for infrastructure 
 
4. China’s FDI in Africa: Reality versus Myth 
     Because of different methodologies, official data on Chinese financial flows differ from data 
from other sources. For example, the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) puts total 
Chinese FDI in Africa at USD 61 billion in 2013, more than double the official figure. In 2013, 
the value of Chinese contracts, a proxy for committed investment flows, reached a staggering 
USD 82 billion. China’s financial involvement in Africa is complex and multifaceted and 
reliable information is not always easily accessible. However, Chinese banks appear to have 
provided some USD 52.8 billion in loans to African countries during 2003–11, equal to 2.8 
percent of China’s GDP. Similarly, little information is available on investment flows from 
countries in SSA to China. SSA’s investment in China appears to be increasing, but remains 
marginal by international standards. South Africa is the only country in SSA with a significant 
investment presence in China (leaving aside Mauritius and Seychelles, which are offshore 
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financial centers). Financial flows from countries in SSA to China are dominated by trading 
companies, often subsidiaries of Chinese firms supporting the business of their parent 
companies. Let’s inquire into some controversial evidences of China’s FDI in Africa. 
Figure: 4.1 The Stock of Chinese FDI to Sub Saharan Africa 
 
   Source: UN Comtrade 
    Firstly, on the scale of China’s direct investment in Africa, Chinese statistics on what they call 
‘overseas direct investment’ (ODI) show a stock of USD 26 billion in Africa as of the end of 
2013. This number would amount to about 3 percent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) on 
the continent. UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2015 similarly finds that the flow of 
Chinese FDI to Africa during 2013-2014 was 4.4 percent of the total to the continent. The 
European Union countries, led by France and the United Kingdom, are the overwhelmingly 
largest investors in Africa. The U.S. is also significant, and even South Africa invests more on 
the continent than China does. Clearly, China’s FDI does not meet the extreme heights many 
believe. 
    Secondly, in concern to natural resources, some researchers examine the allocation across 
African countries of the stock of Chinese ODI and the stock of total FDI (which, as noted, 
mostly comes from Western countries). Other things equal, African countries that are more 
resource rich attract more Chinese investment. However, this effect is about the same for 
Western investment, and it is only one factor determining investment. For example, Chinese ODI 
is also influenced by the size of the domestic market, indicating that some of it is aimed at 
serving that market. All Chinese enterprises making direct investments abroad have to register 
with MOFCOM. The resulting database provides the investing company’s location in China and 
line of business. It also includes the country to which the investment is flowing, and a description 
in Chinese of the investment project. However, it does not include the amount of investment. The 
investment to Africa over the period 1998 – 2012 includes about 2000 Chinese firms investing in 
49 African countries. Firms often have multiple projects, so there are about 4000 investments in 
the database. The researchers consider the typical entry as a private firm that is much smaller 
than the big state-owned enterprises involved in the mega-deals that have captured so much 
attention. These data provide insight into what the Chinese private sector is doing in Africa. 
Based on the descriptions of the overseas investment, researchers categorize the projects into 25 
industries covering all sectors of the economy (primary, secondary, and tertiary). The allocation 
of the projects across countries and across sectors provides a snapshot of Chinese private 
investment in Africa. 
   In terms of sectors, these investments are not concentrated in natural resources and the services 
are the most common sector; and there are significant investments in manufacturing as well. In 
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terms of countries, Chinese investment is everywhere—in resource-rich countries like Nigeria 
and South Africa, but also in non-resource-rich countries like Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. 
Then it is investigated the allocation of projects more rigorously. In particular, it is examined 
whether factor endowments and other country characteristics influence the number and types of 
investment projects from Chinese investors. If Chinese investment is similar to other profit-
oriented investment, then the number and nature of projects should be related to the factor 
endowments and other characteristics of the recipient countries. Indeed, it is found that while 
Chinese ODI is less prevalent in skill-intensive sectors in Africa, it is more prevalent in the more 
skill-abundant countries, suggesting that Chinese investors aim to exploit the local comparative 
advantage. It is also found that Chinese ODI is more concentrated in capital-intensive sectors in 
the more capital-scarce countries, suggesting its importance as a source of external financing to 
the continent. 
    Finally, some researchers examined the relationship between ODI and two governance 
indicators: a measure of property rights and the rule of law, and an index of political stability. 
Total FDI, other things equal, is concentrated in countries with better rule of law. Chinese ODI is 
indifferent to the rule of law measure, but on the other hand is positively correlated with political 
stability. This finding means that Chinese investment is not concentrated in poor rule of law 
countries; the biggest recipient on the continent is South Africa. But it does mean that China’s 
investment is more visible in the poor rule of law countries because China has invested in those 
locations whereas Western investment generally stayed away from them. Countries in which 
China’s share of investment is large include Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Guinea, and Zimbabwe. 
   It seems that the results provide an accurate picture of China’s direct investment in Africa. 
There are other important issues that are not yet examined, such as Chinese workers in Africa or 
Chinese involvement in infrastructure. Chinese lending to African governments to build 
infrastructure, with or without Chinese construction companies, would not typically count as 
direct investment, unless the Chinese partner is taking an equity stake in the infrastructure.  
5. China’s Trade with Sub Saharan Africa 
  Trade flows between China and SSA have expanded dramatically during the past decade and 
show no signs of slowing in the foreseeable future. China-SSA trade has grown by a remarkable 
26 percent per year since 1995, reaching a total value of USD170 billion in 2013. China now 
accounts for roughly 24 percent of SSA’s total trade, up dramatically from a mere 2.3 percent in 
1995. Yet despite China’s enormous and rapidly increasing importance in the region, its 
economic relationship with SSA is not symmetric: in 2013, SSA’s share in Chinese trade reached 
just 3 percent (Figure 5.1). 
   Figure: 5.1 Trade between China and Sub Saharan Africa 
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Source: World Integrated Trade Solution data, World Bank. 
  SSA’s exports to China have grown faster than its imports, generating a large, positive trade 
balance. SSA’s exports are concentrated in primary commodities, especially extractable 
resources such as oil, uranium, aluminum, zinc, phosphates, copper, nickel, and gold, as well as 
renewable resources and agricultural commodities such as timber, rubber, coffee, cotton, cocoa, 
fish, and cashew nuts. While SSA’s export mix is narrowly focused on the primary sector, 
Africa’s imports from China are extremely diversified. Consumer goods represent the largest 
share, particularly textiles and clothing, footwear, and consumer electronics, but capital goods 
such as machinery, commercial electronics, and transportation equipment are also well 
represented (Figure 5.2). Chinese products are often less expensive than similar products 
imported from the European Union or the United States, which makes the products attractive to 
firms and individual consumers alike. In addition, Chinese capital goods imports are boosted in 
the presence of large Chinese-financed infrastructure projects, which frequently include country-
of-origin procurement rules. For decades, SSA exports were overwhelmingly oriented toward 
Western markets, but the region’s trade relationships are shifting; in 2013, China became SSA’s 
most important export partner. China now accounts for 27 percent of SSA’s exports, compared 
with 23 percent for the European Union and 21 percent for the United States. While India 
accounts for just 9 percent, the growth rate of SSA’s exports to India is second only to that of 
China. 
Figure: 5.2 Sub Saharan Africa’s Export to China dominated by the Commodities 
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Source: UN Comtrade 
 
   Overall, SSA has benefitted from China’s increasing demand for SSA’s exports of oil, 
minerals, and metals (Roache 2012). Exporters in SSA have faced very limited competition from 
Chinese exports in third markets, as many of SSA’s export products are unrelated, or even 
complementary, to Chinese products in key markets such as the European Union and the United 
States.  
 
   However, there is evidence that imports from China have had a negative effect on SSA’s 
exports within the African regional market, and local producers and traders have faced serious 
competition from Chinese imports throughout SSA (Figure 5.3). In a study of 44 South African 
manufacturing industries during 1992–2010, Edwards and Jenkins (2014) show that 
labor‐intensive industries were particularly badly affected by Chinese imports and the negative 
impact on employment was more than proportional to the output displacement.  
 
   Moreover, exports of manufactures to China did not add significantly to industrial growth in 
South Africa. But Edwards and Jenkins also find evidence that Chinese imports contributed 
toward lower producer price inflation in South Africa, which in turn contributed to a moderation 
in consumer price increases. There is no question that low prices for imported Chinese goods 
have benefitted African consumers, as well as producers who rely on imported inputs and capital 
goods. Figure 5.3 shows the gap between SSA’s producer prices and the prices of Chinese 
imports in SSA. The comparison reveals a considerable price gap between China’s and SSA’s 
products of about 50 percent. 
 
Figure: 5.3   Price Gap between Chinese and African Producer Prices 
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Source: Pigato and Gourdon (2014) 
    More troubling, African firms do not appear to be positioning themselves within Chinese 
value chains; as a consequence, trade with China is having a limited impact on economic 
transformation and export diversification. Imports of inputs and components for processing and 
assembly have been a major channel for technology transfer in many countries in Asia, 
particularly China. In the standard model, a firm from a developed country would export inputs 
or components to a less developed country with lower wage rates, where a local subsidiary 
would use those inputs to create a finished product for export to one or more third-country 
markets or even back to the original developed country. For many countries, this pattern of trade 
has had highly positive economic impacts by facilitating technology transfer and catalyzing the 
development of dynamic comparative advantage. Input exports from China to SSA for 
processing and subsequent re-export to the U.S. consumer market have increased in recent years 
but remain extremely small as a share of total trade (Pigato and Gourdon 2014). Consequently, 
there is very little evidence that China is using Africa as a platform for its global exports or 
integrating African firms into its international value chains. 
   The gradual liberalization of the Chinese economy and unprecedented high growth in China 
and SSA economies were accompanied by strong growth in trade between China and SSA 
(Figure 5.4), by an average of 30 percent a year since 2003. Overall, SSA has maintained a slight 
trade deficit with China, with fewer than half of the countries, notably Angola, the Republic of 
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and Equatorial Guinea, having a trade 
surplus with China. In addition, the increase in trade with China has outpaced SSA’s trade with 
other regions, both in terms of exports and imports. By 2011, China became the largest 
individual trading partner for the region, with the share of SSA trade with China reaching 
approximately 16 percent, rising from negligible shares in the 1990s. At the same time, 
traditional SSA trading partners’ shares, as measured by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member 
countries, have fallen steadily. 
Figure: 5.4    Sub Saharan Africa’s Trade with the Partner Countries 
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Source: UN Comtrade 
 
   China has become a prominent trade and financial partner for SSA. Trade with China is 
growing much faster than that with the United States and the European Union (Figure 5.4). 
China surpassed the United States to become the region’s largest trading partner in 2009; in 
2013, trade flows with China accounted for 22 percent of the region’s total trade with the rest of 
the world. Official data on Chinese foreign investment and development financing are sparse, but 
flows to SSA appear to have grown substantially. 
 
   China’s trade with SSA is highly concentrated in a few countries. Five countries, Angola, 
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial 
Guinea account for about 75 percent of SSA’s exports to China. Six countries, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Benin, and Angola account for more than 80 percent of SSA’s total 
imports from China. 
 
 
6. Economic Impact through Trade: An Overview 
 
   SSA economies are increasingly exposed to China’s domestic development through direct 
trade expansion. In the last decade, SSA’s exports to China have risen as a share of Gross 
Domestic Product for many countries. The higher export exposure to China is a result of two 
developments. First, the region experienced an expansion in international trade, including its 
trade with China. Between 2001 and 2012, as the value of SSA’s exports expanded by an annual 
average of about 15 percent, exports to China accounted for about 2.5 percentage points of that 
growth. Second, SSA’s exports to China outpaced its export growth across many countries in 
SSA. The contribution of China to SSA’s export growth has become even more important in 
recent years, explaining about 30 percent of total export growth in 2005–12. 
 
    SSA’s larger exposure to China helped shield the region from the global financial crisis. 
Trading with China helped to reduce the region’s historically high export volatility. Although in 
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2000–04 advanced economies contributed an annual average of 6.6 percentage points to SSA’s 
export growth, they contributed less than 1 percentage point in 2005–09 because of their 
economic deceleration. Yet, China increased its contribution to the growth of SSA exports from 
3 percentage points in 2000–04 to 5 percentage points in 2005–09, thus providing a cushion for 
SSA exports and SSA economies in general during the crisis. Indeed, SSA growth suffered only 
a mild and short-lived deceleration despite the recession in advanced economies. 
 
    China’s economic growth has an indirect impact on SSA’s trade through commodity price 
effects. As net exporters of commodities, some SSA countries are affected by fluctuations in 
economic activity in China through its effect on world commodity prices, because China is the 
dominant importer for various commodities. Roache (2012) suggests that aggregate activity in 
China has a significant and persistent impact on the price of oil and some base metals, and this 
impact is rising, while shocks to consumption have no effect on commodity prices. Yu (2011) 
pointed out that China’s high investment rates, supporting industrialization and urbanization, 
have contributed to a large and growing demand for commodities. Rapid growth in China was a 
major contributor to the boom in commodity prices in the 2000s. For instance, China accounted 
for about 20 percent of world consumption of non-renewable energy resources (oil, gas, coal), 23 
percent of major agricultural crops (corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, wheat), and 40 percent of base 
metals (copper, aluminum) in 2010. Overall, China’s demand for base metals dominates its total 
demand for world commodities.  
 
   China also affects SSA economies through its exports. More than half of SSA economies 
maintain a trade deficit with China, with large imports in manufacturing goods. Import-related 
gains reflect lower import prices and access to a wider variety of final and intermediate goods. 
At the same time, imports from China can lead to adjustment pressures on African 
manufacturing sectors as a result of Chinese competition. 
 
   Economic Growth has accelerated strongly in the region over the past two decades, coinciding 
with the expansion in economic ties with China. There has been a direct impact (via rising trade, 
investment aid, and flows) and an indirect one (via China’s demand for and impact on the prices 
of global metals and minerals). These impacts have been reflected in a quadrupling of the 
contribution of exports and investment to growth in gross domestic product in SSA since the 
1990s. Significant Chinese investment and development finance have been channeled into 
infrastructure. This is particularly important for SSA, given that transport and energy 
infrastructure deficits are severe and the returns to investing in infrastructure are large. Improved 
infrastructure contributed more than half of Africa’s improved growth performance in the pre-
2008 decade. Between 2003 and 2009, FDI from China contributed almost 2 percentage points to 
growth in Zambia, about 1 percentage point in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria, 
and 0.5 percentage points in Madagascar (Whalley and Weisbrod 2011). Indirect spillovers from 
growth in China have also been significant, especially for resource exporters. Drummond and 
Liu (2013) report that a 1 percentage point increase in China’s domestic investment growth is 
associated with an average 0.6 percentage point increase in SSA export growth, with a larger 
impact on resource-rich countries, especially oil exporters. For the top five resource-rich SSA 
countries ranked by exports to China as a share of GDP are Angola, South Africa, the Republic 
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of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo in which one percentage point 
increase in China’s domestic investment growth is accompanied by a 0.8 percentage point 
increase in their export growth rate. Renard (2011) points to an additional benefit of China’s 
growth, through reduced consumer and investment prices, as cheaper Chinese manufactures and 
capital goods displace imports from the United States and the European Union. These may be 
partially offset by the displacement of local industries through imports from China (e.g., apparel 
in South Africa and Madagascar. (Ademola, Bankole, and Adewuyi 2009). 
 
Figure: 6.1 Contributions to growth in Gross Domestic Product in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
       IMF (2012a) suggests that several economies in the world are exposed to China’s investment 
led-growth and face growing risks from a deceleration in investment in China. Specifically, a 1 
percentage point slowdown in investment in China is associated with a reduction of global 
growth of just under one-tenth of a percentage point. The impact is about five times larger than 
in 2002. The economies most vulnerable to an investment slowdown in China are regional 
supply chain economies and commodity exporters with relatively less diversified economies. 
SSA’s terms of trade could also be affected by the impact of China on international prices of 
manufacturing products. Thus, growth in manufacturing-producing trading partners such as 
China may benefit the region by weakening price inflation in the basket of SSA’s imports. 
 
    SSA economies are increasingly exposed to China’s domestic development through direct 
trade expansion. In the last decade, SSA’s exports to China have risen as a share of GDP for 
many countries .The higher export exposure to China is a result of two developments. First, the 
region experienced an expansion in international trade, including its trade with China. Between 
2001 and 2012, as the value of SSA’s exports expanded by an annual average of about 15 
percent, exports to China accounted for about 2.5 percentage points of that growth. Secondly, 
SSA’s exports to China outpaced its export growth across many countries in SSA. The 
contribution of China to SSA’s export growth has become even more important in recent years, 
explaining about 30 percent of total export growth in 2005–12. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
     In the years to come, China’s engagement with Africa is expected to grow. The system will 
adapt and adopt easy fixes for some problems, for instance, by increasing spending on training 
African human resources or by enhancing corporate social responsibility programs for local 
African communities. However, given China’s priority of fueling domestic economic growth 
with African resources and market potential, a more profound reconsideration of China’s overall 
strategic engagement with Africa will be required to resolve the most fundamental problems in 
Sino-African relationship. The inertia that currently characterizes China’s policy approaches to 
Africa will most likely remain to be unchanged in the near future. This situation deserves 
effective responses from Africa and from the rest of the world. 
 
  The IMF Working paper finds that China’s domestic investment has a positive and significant 
impact on its imports from SSA, and this impact is larger than on the rest of the world as a 
whole. China’s increasing presence in SSA has supported growth, somewhat similar to the 
impact of Japan’s growing presence on East Asia in the 1960s. China’s engagement has filled 
important infrastructure gaps and encouraged supply chain integration. China is only one of 
several major emerging economies with an interest in SSA, the others being Brazil, India, the 
Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and Turkey. But to benefit fully from the 
opportunities presented by trading partners (including China), countries in SSA need to focus on 
improving domestic policies to reform institutions, increase transparency improve business 
environments, and promote the development of human capital. Closer economic cooperation 
among African countries, for instance, harmonizing laws and facilitating cross-border business 
and collaboration could allow Africa to leverage the benefits of commerce with the major 
emerging market economies. This would also help lower the costs of bureaucracy and improve 
competitiveness. Improvements in regional infrastructure would encourage investment (domestic 
and foreign). Since natural resource wealth will remain important for the region’s growth 
prospects, better integration of the mineral sector into development and macroeconomic policy 
would help shield resource-exporting countries from volatility in commodity prices and assist 
with more sustainable, longer-term socioeconomic development. A higher degree of processing 
of agricultural and raw materials would take better advantage of preferential access to Chinese, 
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